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This study investigates how the first childbirth affects the wage processes of highly attached 
women. We estimate a flexible fixed effects wage regression model extended with post-birth 
fixed effects by the control function approach. Register data on West Germany are used and 
we exploit the expansionary family policy during the late 1980s and 1990s for identification. 
On the return to work after the birth, mothers’ wages drop by 3 to 5.7 per cent per year of 
leave. We find negative selection back to full-time work after birth. We discuss policy 
implications regarding statistical discrimination and results on family gap. 
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An important matter in both political and economic debate is how to integrate and retain
women in the labour market. One particularly important concern is how women with children
perform in the labour market, with an indicator of their relatively poorer performance being
the so-called ￿family gap￿ , the relatively lower hourly wages of women with children compared
to women without children.1 To achieve a better family￿ work balance, parental leave policy has
been widely employed. The main aspect of these schemes is the right to return to a previous
position of employment within a certain period (job-protected maternity leave).
Work interruptions related to birth are expected to a⁄ect mothers￿wages directly through
changes in the formation of human capital. Identifying the causal e⁄ect is challenging, as women
who return to work following childbirth may di⁄er from those who do not. Therefore, comparing
the wages of women before and after childbirth may yield biased estimates. International
statistics show that the employment rates of women with young children are persistently lower
when compared to overall female employment.2 Hence, the group who returns to work after
birth is potentially a non-randomly selected group and it is then interesting to consider which
women from the skill distribution return to work.
In this study, we investigate how the ￿rst childbirth a⁄ects the wage processes of women
with a focus on the return to human capital before and after birth and the e⁄ects of the duration
of parental leave. The novelty in our work is that the wage model explicitly accounts for the
non-randomness of the return to work decision following birth. More particularly, the standard
1For an overview of the family gap, see, e.g. Waldfogel (1998b).
2Employment rates for mothers with children younger than 6 years of age in 1999 were 61.5 % in the US,
55.8 % in the UK, 51.1 % in Germany and 56.2 % in France. They were higher in Scandinavian countries, but
lower in Southern European countries. See OECD (2001).
1wage regression model with unobserved heterogeneity is extended with post-birth ￿xed e⁄ects.
This is meant to capture changes in motivation, energy and commitment in connection with
birth. The e⁄ects after childbirth in the wage regression are identi￿ed through a number of
expansions of nationwide maternity leave durations over a relatively short period.
The empirical analysis is based on a large sample of women who were highly attached to
the labour market. Data are extracted from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
employment register covering the period 1975￿ 2001. The sample is constructed such that the
mothers￿employment and wage histories are observed from the beginning of their working
careers and include interruptions of work relating to ￿rst birth (parental leave). The large
sample of 30,000 women allows us to estimate the wage processes separately for education
groups and women who become mothers at some point in our observation period (the mother
sample) and women who remain childless (the non-mother sample). Hence, heterogeneity of
behaviour among women across the education distribution can be investigated. An additional
advantage of the data is that they cover an interesting period of family policy expansion in
Germany. During a relatively short period of time, parental leave was expanded from 6 months,
in the period 1979 to 1986, to 3 years in 1992.3 The large variation over time makes Germany￿ s
parental leave policy very suitable for our analysis.
While some studies have moved in the direction of controlling for the complete work history
and sequence of events (e.g. Datta Gupta and Smith 2002; Nielsen et al. 2004), and allowing
for heterogeneity in the parameters across education groups (e.g. Anderson et al. 2002; Datta
Gupta and Smith 2002), no study has explicitly modelled the post-birth ￿xed e⁄ects. This
3See Ondrich et al. (1996), Dustmann and Sch￿nberg (2008), and Sch￿nberg and Ludsteck (2007) for
evidence of the e⁄ects of these reforms. However, none of these studies considers the return to work after birth
and relative changes over time, or indirect e⁄ects on the wage processes.
2study shows new evidence that mothers who return to full-time work are negatively selected,
and this holds across all education groups. This implies that standard estimates comparing the
wages among women before and after return (e.g. ￿rst di⁄erences) overstate the causal e⁄ect
of interruption on a woman￿ s wages. While there has been some evidence on return behaviour
(e.g. Lalive and Zweim￿ller 2009; Burgess et al., 2008), little is known about the randomness
of this decision.
Institutions regarding the length of parental leave and also childcare coverage vary greatly
across the OECD countries and the e⁄ect of the extension of parental leave is likely to depend
on the speci￿c institutions.4 Therefore, our results may be informative on behavior around
childbirth in countries with similar institutions; e.g. the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal that
are all countries characterized by relatively long durations of job protected parental leave and
low provision of childcare for 0 to 2 years old. At the same time Germany is one of the countries
with the largest family gap (Harkness and Waldfogel 2003; Davies and Pierre 2005) which casts
doubts on how and whether generous parental leave policies have a⁄ected the labour supply.
In fact, previous evidence for full-time workers in West Germany suggests that an important
source of the family gap is the large drop in wages of around 10￿ 20 per cent per year on the
return to work following birth (Kunze 2002; Ondrich et al. 2003; Ejrn￿s and Kunze 2004;
Sch￿nberg and Ludsteck 2007; Beblo et al. 2009).
The main result in this study is that on the return to full-time work after the ￿rst birth,
mothers￿wages drop by 3 to 5.7 per cent per year of leave, and these estimates are smaller than
those from ￿rst di⁄erences. When we estimate our model in ￿rst di⁄erences by the control
function approach, the estimates are lower because we ￿nd negative selection back to work
4One may expect e⁄ects to vary depending on whether leave periods are short or long (see Ruhm, 1998),
and childcare coverage is high or low.
3after birth. This e⁄ect becomes empirically important because the return rate of mothers is
only about 50 per cent. This means that those mothers who actually return are those who are
exposed to the greatest loss. This is plausible if, for example, highly productive women also
have highly productive partners and hence the marginal utility of income is relatively lower.
We also ￿nd that the return rates decline for highly attached women across our observation
period and therefore the e⁄ect of negative selection is aggravated over time. Therefore, this
￿nding indicates that the mother￿ s position in the labour market has not improved. It is also
noteworthy that our results relate to the e⁄ects throughout the total duration of leave after
￿rst birth, rather than the cost per child related to leave. Finally, a comparison of the predicted
wage processes for mothers and women who remain childless shows sources of family gap around
birth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional
setting for Germany. Section 3 presents the econometric model, while Section 4 describes the
data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the policy
implications and Section 7 concludes.
2 German parental leave legislation (1981 to 1996)
Women who gave birth from 1981 until the end of 1985 were eligible for 6 months of job-
protected maternity leave in Germany. These maternity leave provisions were regulated in
the Mutterschutzgesetz introduced in 1968. A main component of maternity leave is that it
guarantees the right to return to the previous position with the previous employer (job-protected
maternity leave). The law gives working women the right to 6 weeks leave before expected birth
and 8 weeks after birth; meaning that working during the 8 weeks after birth is prohibited. The
414 weeks of leave are fully paid. Women obtain compensation for income loss equivalent to the
average wage for the 3 months before the start of the protected leave period. Compensation is
shared by health insurance, the federal government and the employer. Since 1979, women have
had access to an additional 4 months of job-protected leave, however, this is unpaid in the sense
that the only bene￿ts are paid for by the federal government and health insurance. From 1979
until 1985, bene￿t payments from the third month after birth were ￿xed at a nominal level of
750 German marks (about 383 Euros). That is, about 20 to 30 per cent of average entry wages
as observed in the IABS. These have been subsequently reduced and eligibility rules have been
introduced along with a number of other changes.
Since 1985, maternity leave has been reformed several times. The 1986 reform was a major
reform as it introduced longer parental leave but also extended rights to bene￿t payments to
non-working mothers, and extended the right to parental leave to fathers.5 The main bene￿t
of the parental leave reforms that this study exploits is the sequential extension of the periods
during which the right to return to the previous job can be used (job-protected leave). By 1992,
the job-protection period had been increased to 3 years after birth. For a full overview, see Table
1. In the following, we refer to the complete period of job-protected leave as (job-protected)
parental leave.
[Table 1 about here]
In West Germany, traditionally, childcare is mostly organized by public providers, is only
part time (that is 3￿ 4 hours a day), and is primarily for children aged 3￿ 6 years and this has
5Mothers and fathers can now share parental leave from the third month after birth. We do not include this
change, as it is rare for fathers to take parental leave: less than 3 per cent of fathers in Germany in 1995 took
parental leave.
5not changed very much during our period of interest. In 2001, on average less than 10 percent
of all children 0-2 years old were in childcare. West Germany is in terms of long durations of
parental leave and low childcare coverage most similar to countries such as the Netherlands,
Spain and Portugal (OECD Employment Outlook, 2001).
It is an empirical question whether the expansion of the duration of protected leave di-
rectly a⁄ects the decision to return to work after birth, and whether the e⁄ect is positive or
negative. In an international study, Ruhm (1998) concluded that short leave durations have
a positive impact on employment while longer periods of leave have a negative e⁄ect. Lalive
and Zweim￿ller (2009) found a decline in return rates in Austria when paid parental leave was
expanded from 1 to 2 years. Other studies showed spikes around the time of expiry of paid and
unpaid leave; see Burgess et al.(2008) for Britain and in Schoenberg and Ludsteck (2007) for
Germany.
3 The econometric framework
Our model to estimate wage processes around birth builds on a wage regression with unobserved
heterogeneity, as this is quite standard in the literature, and we extend it with post-birth ￿xed
e⁄ects. The standard part of the model includes, along with a vector of observed human
capital characteristics, Xit, the duration of leave related to ￿rst birth, mit, an unobserved
individual-speci￿c e⁄ect component ￿i, and a time-varying and individual-varying shock, ￿it.
The individual-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿i, captures the general unobserved ability or preference for work.
6The model allows for varying coe¢ cients before and after birth and in levels is written as:6
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where 1(￿) is an indicator function equal to one if the expression in parentheses holds and zero
otherwise. tbirth denotes the period of ￿rst birth. For illustration, the model is written here
in terms of the key parameters, ￿ (before and after ￿rst birth) and ￿, the e⁄ect through leave
related to birth. A well-noted challenge when estimating this model is unobserved heterogeneity,
￿, and its correlation with mit (e.g. Waldfogel 1998a). This will be taken into account by
estimation of equation (1) in ￿rst di⁄erences.7
With extension of the standard model, the unobserved individual e⁄ect can change after
birth; this is modelled by the post-birth individual-speci￿c e⁄ect ￿i.8 This is meant to capture
the fact that the change in motivation, energy and commitment in connection with birth may
be heterogeneous across mothers. Thus, the impact of birth on women￿ s wage processes works
through three channels: the change in the return to human capital (￿
0s); the e⁄ect through the
duration of parental leave (￿) that may be caused by the depreciation of human capital, and
6In the estimation, we ensure that the wage process is a continuous function of accumulated experience.
7Note, the estimated speci￿cation also controls for mobility (plant, occupation and sector) and time e⁄ects.
Another minor extension that we introduce is that wages can increase at a declining rate, even before birth. In
a wage regression conditional on being a mother, this can capture e⁄ects through the timing of birth. Hence, it
may be that women with a relatively lower career progression decide to have a child.
8Note that ￿ captures unobserved heterogeneity across individuals before and after birth. Hence, ￿ is
essentially zero or equal to a constant before birth. It is only after birth that ￿ becomes crucial. The standard
assumptions on individual e⁄ects still apply: both ￿ and ￿ may be correlated with X and m, and E(￿) =
E(￿) = 0: Empirical estimation shows that relaxing these assumptions leaves the results unchanged.
7the change in the individual-speci￿c e⁄ect related to birth (￿i).
By explicitly modelling ￿i we highlight two potential problems in estimating equation (1).
First, estimation by ￿rst di⁄erences does not remove ￿i and a potential source of endogeneity
remains.9 Second, as not all women return to work after childbirth, we only observe wages
after birth for a selected group (a non-random sample). The selection problem arises because
E(￿ijst
i = 1) 6= 0, where st
i is an indicator for whether the woman returns after childbirth
and t indexes the period after birth when the woman returns. To deal with these problems,
we estimate the wage model in equation (1) in ￿rst di⁄erences and replace ￿i with a control
function.




i = 1(Zi(t)￿ + Xi(t)￿ + vi > 0); t = return (2)
where Zi(t) is a set of variables and vi is an error term assumed to be normal. In the empirical
analysis, we focus on the period before and after ￿rst birth, and therefore only one return
decision for each woman is observed and Xi(t) and Zi(t) are measured before ￿rst birth. We
cannot estimate ￿i, but only recover the covariance between ￿i and vi. This is su¢ cient to
consistently estimate the key parameters. The identifying assumption is that if we condition
on v, then s and Z are exogenous to the wage process. Our approach is closely related to
Heckman￿ s sample selection model, since the inverse Mills ratio is used as the control function
(see e.g. Blundell and Dias (2009)).
In this model, the endogeneity of the fertility decision is not considered explicitly. Note,
however, that we estimate the wage processes conditional on the individual work history and
9In the ￿rst-di⁄erence model, ￿i will not be swept out in the ￿rst wage spell after birth.
8￿xed e⁄ects. So what we assume is that the fertility decision conditioned on these characteristics
is exogenous. We acknowledge that this approach does not completely remove the problem, yet
it is very di¢ cult to ￿nd valid instruments for fertility. To allow for more heterogeneity in the
wage processes, we estimate the wage model separately for mothers and non-mothers and by
education group.
To identify the post-birth parameters, we use the policy changes of parental leave as the
set of exclusive restrictions. Women who become mothers during the period 1981 and 1985 are
eligible for 7.5 months of leave (the reference group). Women with births after 1985 are subject
to the expansions in parental leave and this generates the variation used to estimate the e⁄ect
of the expansion on the return after birth (see Table (1)). We assume that the policies did not
a⁄ect the wage process either directly or through the selection into motherhood or the timing
of birth. The particular question for our application is whether the policy changes have induced
changes in the timing of ￿rst birth, as we are only interested in the e⁄ect through leave after
the ￿rst birth. Lalive and Zweim￿ller (2009) have shown that the expansion of paid leave in
Austria signi￿cantly increased the likelihood of second births. It is not obvious though that this
e⁄ect extends to the timing of ￿rst births in the German context of unpaid leave and extremely
low fertility. A caveat of our data is that we do not observe the exact number of children and
the birth of the second child. Therefore, we cannot estimate the cost per child through leave
and we focus on the total e⁄ect of leave related to ￿rst birth.
94 Data
We extract a sample of highly attached mothers from the 2 per cent IAB employment sample
(IABS)10 which contains the population of workers in Germany with at least one employment
spell covered by social security. This data source represents about 80 per cent of the total
employment population in Germany.11 These register data are of very high quality, because of
both their high accuracy of wages (which are based on taxable income) and accurate employ-
ment history data.12 We apply the usual adjustments to the data. For detailed descriptions of
the data source, see Bender et al. (2000).
4.1 Data sample and variables
We select cohorts of highly attached West German mothers who entered the labour market
between 1975￿ 1994 and whose post-schooling work history is observed from the start. The last
period they can be observed is 2001. We de￿ne highly attached mothers as those who have never
worked part-time before birth and who have worked for at least 1 year full-time until birth.13
We keep women who were on job-protected leave during the period 1981￿ 1995 and not later,
to ensure that we can follow them su¢ ciently long after birth (5 years). This also implies that
everybody was at least eligible for 7:5 months of parental leave (including maternity leave of 14
weeks). Only for returners are wages observed after birth. We focus on wage outcomes for those
10IABS is an abbreviation for the Institut f￿r Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Sample.
11Not included are civil servants, the self-employed, students, unpaid family workers and people who are not
eligible for bene￿ts from the social security system.
12For more details on the IABS see Appendix 7.1.
13By construction, we exclude from our sample those who do not start work in a job covered by the social
security system after education, and are never in full-time work. Furthermore, we exclude those who start
working after education and drop out to non-work or part-time work years before having a child.
10returning to full-time work within 3.5 years. We chose this duration as the cut-o⁄ point so as
to have enough returners within every year and education group.14 Non-returners are those not
staying highly attached and include switchers to part-time work or those dropping out of work.
We use only those periods until the second interruption reported in the data. This is to focus
on the e⁄ects around ￿rst births through ￿rst parental leave.15 For the counterfactual analysis,
we keep women for whom we do not observe an interruption during their labour career and who
are still childless by age 39 years (the non-mothers sample).16 Finally, we distinguish between
three education groups: low skilled (10 years of compulsory schooling and less than 1.5 years
of vocational training or college), medium skilled (10 years of schooling and an apprenticeship)
and high skilled (12 or 13 years of schooling and who have achieved a technical college degree,
3￿ 4 years, or a university degree, 4￿ 6 years). In order to generate complete work histories from
￿rst entry into work, we require that the low- and medium-skilled women are not older than
16 years of age in 1975 and the high-skilled women are not older than 23 years of age in 1975.
In our analyses, the main variables are the log of real daily wages17 for full-time work (more
than 35 hours a week), work experience and the leave duration relating to ￿rst childbirth. The
duration of leave is de￿ned as the sum of the total length of work interruption relating to
14Formally, we want to use the longest period of protected leave throughout the observation window, that is
37.5 months. In our empirical implementation, we slightly extend this period to 42 months. How we de￿ne the
cut-o⁄ point is important for the ￿rst stage of the estimator. In the second stage, the actual duration is used.
We have modi￿ed the cut-o⁄ point to test robustness and results were not a⁄ected.
15This is to ensure the best quality of the parental leave variable. For more details on the construction of the
variable see Appendix 7.2. See for a more general discussion in Sch￿nberg (2009).
16We acknowledge that some of these women may have children later than 39, or have had births before entry
at a very young age.
17All wages are measured in Deutsche marks (DM). After 1998, Euros are converted into DM at the exchange
rate of 1 Euro = 1.9553 DM. Wages are de￿ ated by the Consumer Price Index, with 1995 as the base year.
11￿rst birth (parental leave) and extended non-working periods immediately following. As we
estimate the model in ￿rst di⁄erences, we use indicator variables for occupational change based
on 3-digit occupation groups, sector change based on 12 sector groups, and plant changes. In
addition, our instrumental variables for changes in parental leave duration are determined by
the month and year of the reforms.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of the mother and non-mother samples are presented in Table 2. We
can see that age at ￿rst birth is 25 for low-skilled mothers and increases as education level
increases. This corresponds to 5:6 years of work experience for the low-skilled mothers, and
4:8 years for high-skilled mothers at ￿rst birth. Entry wages di⁄er considerably between the
skill groups, showing the importance of entry conditions. Wage levels during the career also
increase with education and experience. 16￿19 per cent per year of workers change plant, and
around 10 per cent per year change occupation.
[Table 2 about here]
The descriptives show two main ￿ndings. First, we ￿nd low return rates among mothers.
On average, only 50 percent of mothers return to full-time employment, even within 3.5 years
after birth.18 Second, the returning wage levels are some 5￿ 10 per cent lower in real terms just
after birth than in the last period before birth. Taken together this raises the question whether
the wage drop is purely due to heterogeneity, or because the group of returning mothers is a
selected group.
18Approximately one fourth return to part-time.
12The data also re￿ ect typical ￿ndings that returns to experience, or wage growth, are rel-
atively large early in careers and declining thereafter, as is mobility. Comparing mothers and
non-mothers shows that entry wages for mothers are signi￿cantly smaller than for non-mothers,
but the di⁄erences are not very substantial at only some 3￿ 7 per cent.19
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 depicts how the distribution of completed leave duration has changed throughout
the reforms. The ￿gure reveals spikes around the time of expiry of protected parental leave. The
ratio of women not returning to full-time employment increased from 32 -37 per cent in 1981-85
to 50-56 per cent in 1992 and after. These patterns hold across the three education groups.
Hence, despite the fact that the reforms made it more attractive to return to employment
because a similar position was guaranteed, the actual return to work rate has declined (at least
within the 3.5 years we regard as the medium run).
In the econometric analysis, we take into account general trends in the pattern of return to
work and use the within-year variation induced by the reforms for identi￿cation. The variation
we exploit can be illustrated by the reforms in January 1986 and in July 1989. The lower part
of Table 3 reports that those women giving birth in the second half of 1989 (and commencing
leave 6 weeks before expected birth) have a 2￿ 6 percentage points lower probability of returning
to work than those who give birth in the ￿rst half of 1989. While the variation is smaller in
the years when the reform takes place on 1 January, e.g. in 1986, we can still exploit this e⁄ect
because the period of leave commences before birth.
[Table 3 about here]
19In the US, Lundberg and Rose (2000) found a di⁄erence of 9 per cent on average across all education groups.
135 Results
5.1 Estimation results
We estimate the model in equation (1) by ￿rst di⁄erences estimation separately for the low-,
medium- and high-skilled mothers and correct for the non-random decision to return to work
after childbirth. In the ￿rst-stage probit regression in Table 4, we include in addition to the ￿ve
dummy variables for the policy changes de￿ned by month and year, exogenous variables from
the wage equation in ￿rst di⁄erences, that is, changes in individual characteristics and the time
dummies. All explanatory variables are measured at the last employment spell before birth.
Our estimation results show very strongly that conditional on the controls, the reforms decrease
the probability of returning to full-time employment for all education groups. Tests for joint
signi￿cance of all the dummy variables for policy changes show that they are highly signi￿cant
for all three education groups. Based on the probit estimation, we generate the control function
(the inverse Mills ratio) and add it to our main wage regressions in ￿rst di⁄erences.
[Table 4 and 5 about here]
In Table 5 the estimation results from the control function approach are reported.20 The
return to experience during early career and before birth is quite high. It is largest for low-
skilled mothers, 8:9 per cent, for an increase from 3 to 4 years of experience and lowest for the
high-skilled mothers, 4:0 per cent, respectively. An additional non-linear e⁄ect works through
the time e⁄ects 3 years before birth that we allow for in the estimated wage model. This
shows that even before childbirth, wages start to decline, except for the high skilled. Across all
education groups, returns to experience substantially decrease after birth to around 2:6 (low-
20We have investigated robustness of our results which we describe in the Appendix 7.3.
14skilled mothers) and 2:1 (high-skilled mothers) per cent when experience increases from 3 to 4
years.
Extended parental leave in connection with birth leads to a signi￿cant wage decline in all
education groups. For the medium-skilled, the fall is 5:8 per cent per year in real wages. It
is somewhat lower for the high-skilled, just 4:4: per cent per year, but this is less precisely
estimated. It is lowest for low-skilled mothers at only 3:4 per cent per year. The di⁄erences are
only statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent between low- and medium-skilled mothers. The test for
homogeneity across education groups is however rejected (See Table 5). It is interesting to note
that while these are not negligible values, the estimated falls in real wages are smaller than
those from simple ￿rst-di⁄erence estimates; for the estimation results, see Table 6.21 The fact
that ￿rst di⁄erences yields smaller e⁄ects than previous studies may be because the e⁄ects are
estimated separately by education group and more generally account for more heterogeneity
than in other studies. Interestingly, the estimated e⁄ects decrease further once we control for
non-randomness in the return process. Hence, the estimated e⁄ect by ￿rst di⁄erences is a
composite e⁄ect. Simple calculations show that selection accounts for 40 per cent of the ￿rst-
di⁄erence estimate of the e⁄ect through leave duration for the low-skilled. The corresponding
￿gures are 60 per cent for the medium-skilled and 53 per cent for the high-skilled. We regard
the remaining e⁄ect as human capital depreciation.22
While other controls for mobility have economically plausible signs, interpretation is com-
plicated as mobility may still be endogenous. The average e⁄ect of mobility during the entire
21These estimates are also smaller than ￿ndings from previous studies. See Beblo et al. (2009), Schoenberg
et al. (2007). Both studies focus on full-time working women.
22As shown in a previous study using GSOEP data, we cannot rule out that part of this gap is explained by
the loss of bonus payments and other fringe bene￿ts. See Ejrn￿s and Kunze (2004, pp. 43).
15period of observation is positive, particularly for plant mobility. However, in connection with
the return after birth we ￿nd negative e⁄ects. For the low-skilled mothers the estimate is ￿7:5
per cent (= 5:3 ￿ 12:8) and for medium-skilled mothers ￿2:2 per cent (= 5:4 ￿ 7:6). It is not
signi￿cant for the high-skilled.
[Figure 2 here]
In Table 5 we can see that the estimated coe¢ cient for the control function is highly
signi￿cant and negative for all three education groups. This re￿ ects negative selection back
to full-time employment among mothers. To illustrate the operation of negative selection, in
Figure 2 we depict the predicted wage pro￿le for a medium-skilled woman giving birth in 1990
who actually returns to full-time employment after 1 year of leave. We ￿nd that this woman
compared to the ￿average￿ mother23 experiences a much larger drop in wages around the ￿rst
birth. It implies that ignoring the selection process for a return to full-time employment will
overestimate the mean drop in wages in connection with childbirth. A comparison between the
education groups shows that negative selection is less pronounced for the low-skilled and more
pronounced for the medium and high-skilled.24
In Figure 2 we also compare the same woman￿ s wages to the hypothetical wages that she
would experience without the birth, that is if she were to postpone ￿rst birth to very late, here
1999.25 Then we see a gain from postponement, primarily, since the returns are highest during
the early career, and returns decrease already before birth.
23The ￿average￿mother is de￿ned as a woman who has ￿i equal to 0; whereas the mother that returns has
￿i equal to E(￿ijst
i = 1):
24The ￿gures for the low and high-skilled are available from the authors upon request.
25We chose as an example the postponement of ￿rst birth to 1999 since then until 1995 the pro￿le is purely
based on the estimated return to experience before birth.
16To illustrate the di⁄erences between the wage processes for mothers and non-mothers we
also plot the predicted wage processes for a medium-skilled non-mother in Figure 2.26 As shown,
non-mothers have a slightly higher entry wage but a lower return to experience at the beginning
of their labour market career. However, the average returns to experience after birth (for those
women having children) is much lower than before birth, and is also low when compared to
non-mothers. The comparison reveals three sources of family gap for those who have children:
the wage level of mothers is comparably low at ￿rst entry (see Table 2) and decreases just
before birth, they fall behind because of a wage decline on return after leave, and their return
to experience is relatively low after birth.
5.2 Discussion
While the negative selection of return to work may be surprising, particularly for all education
groups, it is consistent with a number of economic explanations. Our data, however, are too
limited to pinpoint which of these best ￿ts the data. Negative selection can, for example, arise
because of assortative matching. If highly productive women are married to highly productive
men with high earnings, these women can work less and therefore the negative selection is driven
by an income e⁄ect. The negative selection could also be generated through specialization in
work after birth and by purchasing childcare. This outcome can be derived in a model extending
Becker ￿ s (1985) one-period model to a two-period model (before and after ￿rst birth) where the
e⁄ort intensity of household production increases after birth. In this case, wages will decline
after birth because more e⁄ort is devoted to housework. The ￿nding may also capture that
highly productive women choose to space their births closer and therefore do not return to work
26The complete results for the non-mother samples are reported in Appendix 7.4.
17within 3.5 years.27 Other explanations could follow from a backward-bending labour supply
curve.
The negative selection is also interesting from a policy perspective. As we have seen,
negative selection implies a tendency to overestimate the mean loss from childbirth if this
aspect is ignored. This is important if employers form their expectations about the productivity
losses of mothers on the basis of what they observe (which means the performance of women
who actually returned). Employers will then overestimate the losses and this means that if
an ￿average mother￿decides to return, she would actually be paid too low a wage because of
statistical discrimination.
[Figure 3 here]
To illustrate this aspect, we compare the impact of the reforms during the late 1980s. In
Figure 3, we plot the predicted wage paths for a medium-skilled woman giving birth in 1981
and hypothetically the same woman giving birth in 1990. The wage pro￿le of the ￿average
mother￿is not a⁄ected by the reforms, but if we only look at those who actually return, the
drop in wages becomes much larger for the woman giving birth in 1990 compared to the same
woman giving birth in 1981. The expansion of parental leave has the e⁄ect that the fraction of
mothers returning to full- time employment declines, and this leads to an indirect e⁄ect on those
mothers who actually do return because they are more exposed to statistical discrimination.
These indirect e⁄ects of parental leave schemes on labour supply are important for the design of
parental leave schemes, as this mechanism induces relatively less productive mothers to return.
Our results focus on the wage processes of women staying highly attached in the labour
27Kreyenfeld (2002) showed for West Germany that approximately 50 per cent of all mothers, born between
1961 and 1963, have a second birth within 3.5 years.
18market, that is, those who return to a full-time career after birth, which amounts to an impor-
tant and large group of women. In order to generalize results a concern is that the de￿nition of
highly attached may be restrictive, primarily, since it does not include those who temporarily
switch to part-time work and then return to full-time work. While the IABS data are too lim-
ited to make wages from full-time work and part-time work comparable, we argue that inclusion
of wages from part-time work would not change our main results on negative selection. It might
be that the most productive women temporarily transit into part-time work. However, even
if this were the case our results will still show that there exists a potential for an increase of
the labour force with on average more productive women; in this case by encouraging mothers
in part-time work to return to full-time employment. The size of the potential increase in the
labour force will of course depend on how many and how fast these women in part-time work
return to full-time.
6 Concluding remarks
In this study, we analysed women￿ s wage processes for Germany with a particular focus on
the phase around ￿rst birth. We found that the selection process of return to work and the
wage process around birth are strongly related. The results also indicate negative selection,
i.e. mothers who su⁄er from relatively large wage losses in connection with birth are those
relatively more likely to return to full-time employment after birth. Women￿ s wages are nega-
tively a⁄ected by the duration of leave relating to birth. Furthermore, the return to experience
is lower after childbirth than before, and lower for mothers than for non-mothers. Compar-
isons across education groups reveal considerable heterogeneity. Finally, we document that the
wage processes of women who become mothers and women who remain childless develop very
19di⁄erently, despite small di⁄erences at labour market entry.
Our results contrast with previous ￿ndings for Germany that have shown large declines in
wages after birth by international standards for women in full-time work (Schoenberg et al.,
2007; Beblo et al. 2008). Our ￿ndings suggest that estimates conditional on returning to work
underestimate the average productivity of women with small children. Furthermore, our results
demonstrate that the expansionary parental leave policy actually did not create incentives for
highly productive mothers to return to work. These ￿ndings have important implications. First,
expansionary reforms between 1985 and 1995 have prevented the improvement of mothers￿
positions in the labour market. Some indicators of this are the decline in the return rate to
full-time work across this period and the increase in the average duration of leave. Second,
given mothers who return to work relatively shortly after birth are a negatively selected group,
￿rms may have excessively low expectations about the mean productivity of all mothers.
A question following from our analysis is whether non-random selection back to work is
generally of importance for studies on the wage changes of women around birth and the family
gap. One argument that this is potentially a more general issue, is that the employment rates
of women with young children are lower than for women overall in many countries. The result
of negative selection may arguably be important for countries with parental leave and childcare
institutions similar to Germany. In addition, the career changes of women after birth are widely
observed and a question is what fraction of women return to their pre-birth (highly attached)
pro￿le. Only detailed analyses of large longitudinal micro data can reveal such compositional
changes. We consider these questions of broad interest for future research.
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23Table 1: Parental leave durations between 1979 and 2001
Job-protected leave
Children Maternity Parental Total protected leave Hours
born between.. leave1 leave [bene￿t eligibility] , before and after of
paid month 3 plus after birth birth part-time
per week2
1.7.1979-31.12.1985 1.5+2 months 4 months [4 months] 7.5 months
1.1.1986-31.12.1987 1.5+2 months 8 months [8 months] 11.5 months 15
1.1.1988-30.6.1989 1.5+2 months 10 months [10 months] 13.5 months 15
1.7.1989-30.6.1990 1.5+2 months 13 months [13 months] 16.5 months 19
1.7.1990-31.12.1991 1.5+2 months 16 months [16 months] 19.5 months 19
1.1.1992-31.12.1992 1.5+2 months 34 months [16 months] 37.5 months 19
1.1.1993-30.12.2000 1.5+2 months 34 months [22 months] 37.5 months 19
Notes: 1Maternity leave is fully paid based on average wage during the three months before birth.
2 These are the number of hours one is allowed to work while on leave.
Sources: Mutterschutzgesetz 25.06.1979,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 3: The return rate of mothers going on parental leave in 1985 and 1989
Leave starts Appr. date of Max. leave Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
￿rst birth (months) no obs pct no obs pct no obs pct
1.1-31.10.1985 1.3-31.12 1985 7.5 564 64.18 920 64.35 53 67.92
1.11￿ 31.12.1985 1.1-28.2 1986 11.5 39 58.97 53 49.06 3 66.67
Test for no di⁄erence ￿2
(1) (p ￿ value) 0:42 (p = 0:51) 5:05 (p = 0:03) 0:01 (p = 0:96)
1.1-30.4.1989 1.1 -30.6 1989 13.5 283 49.47 538 48.33 39 56.41
1.5-31.12.1989 1.7-31.12 1989 16.5 419 47.73 732 43.31 38 50.00
Test for no di⁄erence ￿2
(1) (p ￿ value) 0:20 (p = 0:65) 3:15 (p = 0:08) 0:31 (p = 0:58)
Notes: IABS 1975￿ 2001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Table 4: Selection equation: return or not return to fulltime work after birth deci-
sion estimated as a probit model
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
￿Experience (yrs) .074 (.072) -.057 (.052) -.133 (.214)
￿Experience (yrs)2 -.013￿￿￿ (.002) -.006￿￿￿ (.002) -0.009 (.008)
Plant change .041 (.068) .107￿￿ (.046) .643￿￿￿ (.200)
Occupation change .036 (.073) .156￿￿￿ (.056) .190 (.248)
Protected leave in months (period)
Leave=10 (1/1986-12/1987) -.125 (.121) -.135 (.090) -.809￿ (.437)
Leave=12 (1/1988-6/1989) -.220￿ (.123) -.329￿￿￿ (.090) -.867￿￿ (.417)
Leave=15 (7/1989￿ 6/1990) -.420￿￿￿ (.128) -.607￿￿￿ (.092) -.995￿￿ (.418)
Leave=18 (7/1990￿ 12/1991) -.523￿￿￿ (.128) -.705￿￿￿ (.091) -1.284￿￿￿ (.394)
Leave=36 ( 1/1992-12/1995) -.759￿￿￿ (.138) -.654￿￿￿ (.091) -1.034￿￿￿ (.367)
Number of observations 8,969 16,342 1,113
Pseudo R-squared 0.028 0.022 0.044
Test for joint signi￿cance of the leave duration variables
Test statistic ￿2
(5) 36.95 (p=0.00) 92.49 (p=0.00) 11.74 (p=0.04)
Notes: IABS 1975￿ 2001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
26Table 5: Estimation results of the wage regression in ￿rst di⁄erences (control func-
tion approach) for mother sample
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.)
Variables before ￿rst birth
￿Experience (yrs) .138￿￿￿ (.003) .109￿￿￿ (.002) .065￿￿￿ (.008)
￿Experience (yrs)2 -.007￿￿￿ (.001) -.006￿￿￿ (.000) -.004￿￿￿ (.001)
Dummy for 3 years before -.013￿￿￿ (.001) -.010￿￿￿ (.001) .007 (.005)
Variables in connection with ￿rst birth
Duration of leave (yrs) ￿ .034￿￿￿ (.007) -.058￿￿￿ (.006) -.044￿ (.023)
Plant change* (mat. leave) -.128￿￿￿ (.018) -.076￿￿￿ (.012) .049 (.051)
Occupation change*(mat.leave) .021 (.030) -.005 (.016) -0.08 (.069)
Variables after ￿rst birth
￿Experience (yrs) .024￿￿￿ (.003) .026￿￿￿ (.004) .026￿￿ (.025)
￿Experience (yrs)2 .0004￿￿ (.0001) -.000 (.0002) -.001 (.001)
Other controls
Plant change .053￿￿￿ (.003) .054￿￿￿ (.001) .031￿￿￿ (.001)
Occupation change .008￿￿ (.004) .012￿￿￿ (.002) .040￿￿￿ (.012)
Inverse Mills ratio -.046￿￿￿ (.010) -.082￿￿￿ (.008) -.084￿￿ (.034)
Number of observations 75,982 132,873 8,474
Number of individuals 8,969 16,342 1,113
R-squared 0.154 0.166 0.110
Test for educational homogeneity
Test statistic ￿2(92) 343.66 p-value 0.00
Notes: IABS 1975￿ 2001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
27Table 6: Estimation results of the wage regression in ￿rst di⁄erences for mother
sample
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.)
Variables before ￿rst birth
￿Experience (yrs) .137￿￿￿ (.003) .108￿￿￿ (.002) .064￿￿￿ (.008)
￿Experience (yrs) 2 -.007￿￿￿ (.001) -.006￿￿￿ (.000) -.004￿￿￿ (.001)
Dummy for 3 years before -.013￿￿￿ (.001) -.010￿￿￿ (.001) .007 (.005)
Variables in connection with ￿rst birth
Duration of leave (yrs) ￿ .055￿￿￿ (.005) -.096￿￿￿ (.004) -.083￿￿￿ (.018)
Plant change* (mat. leave) -.130￿￿￿ (.019) -.086￿￿￿ (.012) .040 (.051)
Occ. change*(mat.leave) .021 (.020) -.005 (.016) -.096 (.068)
Variables after ￿rst birth
￿Experience (yrs) .019￿￿￿ (.003) .014￿￿￿ (.004) .022 (.025)
￿Experience (yrs)2 .0004￿￿ (.0001) -.000 (.000) -.001 (.001)
Other controls
Plant change .053￿￿￿ (.003) .054￿￿￿ (.002) .032￿￿￿ (.010)
Occupation change .008￿￿ (.004) .012￿￿￿ (.002) .039￿￿￿ (.012)
Number of observations 75,982 132,873 8,474
Number of individuals 8,969 16,342 1,113
R-squared 0.153 0.164 0.108
Test for educational homogeneity
Test statistic ￿2(90) 336.50 p-value 0.00
Notes: IABS 1975￿ 2001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
28Figure 1: The distribution of actual leave by education groups
29Figure 2: The predicted wage pro￿les for medium-skilled women
Figure 3: The predicted wage pro￿les for medium-skilled mothers giving birth
in 1981 and 1990
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7.1 Data
The IABS is representative for the population of workers in Germany who are
covered by social security. It is a 2 per cent random sample of workers in every
period and for all of the workers complete time series during the observation
window 1975-2001 are included. The sample is drawn from the (100 per cent)
employment statistics, collected by the German Federal Bureau of Labour. Data
from the employment statistics are supplemented by information on bene￿t
receipt (Leistungsempfaengerdatei) and information about the plant.
Wages in the data are reported as daily wages (income during a spell divided
by the number of days of employment). Contributions to social security have to
be paid only up to a limit. This implies that wages are topcoded in the IABS
but as we have calculated top coding a⁄ects only 4 per cent of wages in our
sample of young women. We drop jobs with wages that fall below the lower
bound of social security eligibility. We de￿ne full-time daily wages as wages in
jobs with more than 35 hours per week.
The data includes information on every change in working status distin-
guished into work, interruptions and unemployment and these changes are re-
ported on a calendar date basis. Mobility (establishment, occupation and sec-
tor) induces a new spell in the IABS and, hence, wage changes can be measured
accurately. If the employee changes establishment or the position within the
establishment, the employment spell ends and a new spell starts. Moreover,
the establishment has to report all information by 1 January every year that
leads to individual records with at least one spell per year, if employed, and
no employment spell exceeding 1 year. Unemployment is reported in case of
receipt of unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance. Interruptions
indicate that the employer-employee relationship is on hold, yet the contract is
still valid. In this case no wage payments are made. Every other status that
does not fall into either of these categories results in a gap of the individual
record of spells reported in the data.
7.2 Construction of duration of leave related to ￿rst birth
A core variable to our analysis is the duration of leave in connection with ￿rst
child birth. This variable we measure by the duration of the ￿rst interruption
since entry into the labour market and only for women who have worked full
time until start of maternity leave (highly attached women). By law for every
employed woman the ￿rm has to grant maternity leave 6 weeks before expected
birth and at least 2 months after. Hence, technically, every birth leads to
a report of an interruption in the IABS as long as the woman is employed.
Interruptions may also be reported if a worker is absent for a longer period
because of health problems, for example. While we cannot exclude this by the
available data that lacks accurate information on number of children and health,
this has been shown in Schoenberg (2009) to be only a problem in less than 9
31Table 1: Number of leave durations in the sample of mothers from the
IABS
low skilled medium skilled high skilled
1981 350 286 24
1982 425 395 28
1983 519 514 41
1984 524 723 35
1985 603 973 56
1986 577 827 37
1987 565 1,024 63
1988 644 1,130 56
1989 702 1,270 75
1990 762 1,394 83
1991 728 1,470 96
1992 664 1,415 100
1993 641 1,513 119
1994 655 1,696 143
1995 610 1,712 157
In total 8,969 16,342 1,113
Notes: IABS 1975￿ 2001, sample of highly attached mothers.
per cent of all interruptions (including interruptions at older ages) for women of
childbearing ages. We argue that this, like health reason induced interruptions,
is a rare event for highly attached young women and ￿rst interruptions as in
our sample.1 Since leaves for consecutive births can be taken straight after one
another and we do not observe the number of births, we acknowledge that some
leaves are taken in connection with more than one birth. This e⁄ect is increasing
the tighter the spacing between births and perhaps increasingly relevant for
highly skilled mothers who start later in life to form families. Another issue
is that leave starts 6 weeks before expected birth. But eligibility rules are
determined by actual birth dates that we do not observe. We use the rule that
the date of start of leave plus 4 weeks determines which regime applies. Since
virtually all births are 2 weeks before or after expected date of birth we capture
almost all births by this rule but we acknowledge that to some we connect too
long duration eligibility. This may lead to underestimation of the e⁄ect on
return. In Table (1) we show numbers of leave durations related to ￿rst birth
by year and by skill group in our sample of highly attached women.
1Schoenberg (2009) uses data on fertility from not-publicly available pension data that
were merged for a method report to the IABS at IAB. Applying less restrictive rules than
those in this study less than 9 percent are not leaves due to births. Note, the sample includes
higher order births.
327.3 Robustness of the results
To investigate how robust our results are to changes in the model speci￿cation
we have performed various sensitivity checks. First, regarding the selection
equation, we have modelled the duration of the leave by a double censored
Tobit model and constructed the control function on the basis of this model.
The magnitude of the coe¢ cients are unchanged but less precisely estimated
and the negative selection is still found. Second, we have also examined the
assumption regarding the post-birth e⁄ects, that is the case that E(￿i) 6= 0;
which implies that if E(￿i) < 0 on average all mothers are less productive
after birth. This leads to a decrease of the e⁄ects of duration of leave, but
the negative selection results survive. Third, in the main equation we have
tried a more ￿ exible form of the duration of leave variable. Using a non-linear
term in the duration of leave did not change the results. We have tried using
dummy variables and a polynomial instead of including the duration as a linear
function. Furthermore, we have also tried to include a dummy for childbirth
and the duration of the interruption. We have also experimented changing the
cut-of point for the return decision from three and a half to one or two years.
In both cases the e⁄ect through negative selection becomes slightly smaller but
remains signi￿cant.
7.4 Estimation results for non-mothers
Table 2: Estimation results of the wage regression model in ￿rst dif-
ferences for the non mother sample
Variable low skilled medium skilled highly skilled
coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.)
￿Experience .044 (.005)*** .048 (.006)*** .049 (.016)***
￿Experience2 -.001 (.0001)*** -.001 (.0001)*** -.001 (.0003)***
Occupation change .004 (.007) -.003 (.007) -.001 (.019)
Firm change .036 (.005)*** .041 (.004)*** .03 (.014)***
Number of observations 20,196 21,566 4,444
Number of individuals 1,671 1,787 480
R-squared .1028 .095 .0613
Notes: IABS 1975￿ 2001, sample of highly attached women.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
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